:In this essay I begin with Foucault's theorization of the convulsive body of the possessed as a site of struggle. Next, I amend this perspective with Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's notion that “the concept is not object but territory” 101). That is, rather than looking at convulsive bodies as objects through which actors struggle, I approach convulsions as evidencing acts of territorialization. Instead of a corporeal object over which actors struggle for ownership, this perspective reframes convulsions as a process (...) of space-making that is constitutive of the space-makers. Amending Foucault's take on convulsions with Deleuze and Guattari's notion of territory allows for analysis of “techno-horror” popular entertainments as constitutive processes in the unfolding of new reproductive masculine subjectivities. (shrink)

les détails relatifs à l’ordre spontané en attirant notre attention sur la réflexion sous-jacente qui se manifeste à travers tout ce processus évolutionnaire, ainsi que sur la nature de cet ordre spontané qui présente une dépendance de sentier. Le fait que la “magie” de l’ordre spontané ait été considérée comme un fait acquis a engendré une sorte de sous-investissement dans les recherches visant à approfondir la connaissance de ce qui anime les institutions émergentes “de l’action humaine mais non d’un (...) dessein humain”. Reconnaissant cet état de fait, Samuels a tenté de se “salir les mains” en se penchant de plus près sur le miracle de l’ordre spontané. Dans cet article, les auteurs font une analyse descriptive de la thèse de Samuels mais prennent aussi le temps de reconnaître que son travail se présente comme une formation hybride de l’oeuvre contractualiste de Buchanan et de l’oeuvre de Hayek dans le domaine de l’évolution sociale.Warren Samuels’ continues trying to “work out” the details of the spontaneous order by drawing our attention to the underlying deliberation present throughout this entire evolutionary process, as well as the path dependent nature of the spontaneous order. The taking for granted of the “magical” features of the spontaneous order has caused an under-investment in research attempting to get inside to examine what really drives the institutions emerging from “human action, but not of human design.” Recognizing this, Samuels has attempted to get his hands dirty by looking much closer at the miracle of the spontaneous order. In this piece the authors offer a descriptive analysis of Samuels’ thesis, while also taking the time to recognize Samuels’ work in political economy as a hybridization of Buchanan’s contractarian work and Hayek’s work in social evolution. (shrink)

The use of terms like “collaboration” and “co-workers” to describe interactions between human beings and certain artificial intelligence (AI) systems has gained significant traction in recent years. Yet, it remains an open question whether such anthropomorphic metaphors provide either a fertile or even a purely innocuous lens through which to conceptualize designed commercial products. Rather, a respect for human dignity and the principle of transparency may require us to draw a sharp distinction between real and faux peers. At the heart (...) of the concept of collaboration lies the assumption that the collaborating parties are (or behave as if they are) of similar status: two agents capable of comparable forms of intentional action, moral agency, or moral responsibility. In application to current AI systems, this not only seems to fail ontologically but also from a socio-political perspective. AI in the workplace is primarily an extension of capital, not of labor, and the AI “co-workers” of most individuals will likely be owned and operated by their employer. In this paper, we critically assess both the accuracy and desirability of using the term “collaboration” to describe interactions between humans and AI systems. We begin by proposing an alternative ontology of human–machine interaction, one which features not two equivalently autonomous agents, but rather one machine that exists in a relationship of heteronomy to one or more human agents. In this sense, while the machine may have a significant degree of independence concerning the means by which it achieves its ends, the ends themselves are always chosen by at least one human agent, whose interests may differ from those of the individuals interacting with the machine. We finally consider the motivations and risks inherent to the continued use of the term “collaboration,” exploring its strained relation to the concept of transparency, and consequences for the future of work. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 3, March 2020, Page 83-85.

Since the origins of the notion of emergence in attempts to recover the content of vitalistic anti-reductionism without its questionable metaphysics, emergence has been treated in terms of logical properties. This approach was doomed to failure, because logical properties are either sui generis or they are constructions from other logical properties. If the former, they do not explain on their own and are inevitably somewhat arbitrary (the problem with the related concept of supervenience, Collier, 1988a), but if the latter, reducibility (...) is assured because logical constructs are reducible, by definition, to their logical components. A satisfactory account of emergence must recognise that it is a dynamical, not a logical property of property of natural systems, and that its basis is dynamical rather than logical composition. Collier (1988a) introduced the concept of cohesion as the closure of the causal relations among the dynamical parts of a dynamical particular that determine its resistance to external and internal fluctuations that might disrupt its integrity. Cohesion is an equivalence relation that partitions a set of dynamical particulars into unified and distinct entities, providing the identity conditions for such particulars. Cohesion blocks reduction of dynamical particulars, and is necessary for dynamical emergence. We will give reasons for thinking that cohesion might be sufficient for emergence as well. (shrink)

Entrepreneurs have a unique opportunity to cultivate the moral direction and development of their organizations, precisely because those organizations are new. Towards this end, we suggest that the Golden Rule is a simple, practical heuristic for entrepreneurs seeking to establish a fair social contract with their stakeholders. Because justice is an important central moral criterion in organizations, we attempt to show theoretically that the Golden Rule passes critical tests of justice, as outlined in the work of John Rawls, and can (...) also serve as a universally relevant hypernorm which have been argued to ground all social contracts. We introduce some important contextual findings from the entrepreneurship literature in order to ground our discussion and create realistic scenariosfor entrepreneurs and their stakeholders. In so doing, we present an important potential limitation of the Golden Rule in practice and suggest how entrepreneurs might reconcile it. Ultimately, we believe that if entrepreneurs were to reflect upon their particular situation, they would have good reasons to choose to employ the Golden Rule as a part of their overall strategy for moral and economic success. (shrink)

Over two hundred years ago, Thomas Jefferson suggested the need for a broader legal curriculum. As the twenty-first century begins, the practice of law will increasingly demand interdisciplinary knowledge and collaboration — between those trained in law and a broad range of scientific and technical fields, including engineering, biology, genetics, ethics, and the social sciences. The practice of public health law provides a model for both the substantive integration of law with science, and for the way its practitioners work. In (...) addition, public health law also provides a model for interdisciphuy and integrative teaching. (shrink)

The rise of the phenomenon of virtue ethics in recent years has increased at a rapid pace. Such an explosion carries with it a number of great possibilities, as well as risks. This volume has been written to contribute a multi-faceted perspective to the current conversation about virtue. Among many other thought-provoking questions, the collection addresses the following: What are the virtues, and how are they enumerated? What are the internal problems among ethicists, and what are the objections and replies (...) to contemporary virtue ethics? Additionally, the practical implications following from the answers to these questions are discussed in new and fascinating research. Fundamental concepts such as teleology and eudaimonism are addressed from both a historical and dialectical approach. This tome will contribute not only to providing further clarity to the current horizons in virtue ethics, but also to the practical conclusion following from the study: to challenge the reader toward a greater pursuit of the virtuous life. (shrink)

Although informed consent is important in clinical research, questions persist regarding when it is necessary, what it requires, and how it should be obtained. The standard view in research ethics is that the function of informed consent is to respect individual autonomy. However, consent processes are multidimensional and serve other ethical functions as well. These functions deserve particular attention when barriers to consent exist. We argue that consent serves seven ethically important and conceptually distinct functions. The first four functions pertain (...) principally to individual participants: (1) providing transparency; (2) allowing control and authorization; (3) promoting concordance with participants' values; and (4) protecting and promoting welfare interests. Three other functions are systemic or policy focused: (5) promoting trust; (6) satisfying regulatory requirements; and (7) promoting integrity in research. Reframing consent around these functions can guide approaches to consent that are context sensitive and that maximize achievable goals. (shrink)

Central to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s philosophical revival of rhetoric and dialectic is the importance given to the temporal character of argumentation. Unlike demonstration, situated within the “empty time” of a single instant, the authors of The New Rhetoric understand argumentation as an action that unfolds within the “full time” of meaningful human life. By taking a broader view of his work beyond The New Rhetoric, I first outline Perelman’s understanding of time and temporality and the challenge that it poses for (...) the study of argumentation. Next, I emphasize the distinction between argumentation’s internal and external temporal structures, and then show how Perelman problematizes a static view of a number of basic argumentative concepts by bringing out their essentially temporal character. Finally, in clarifying what is at stake in Perelman’s account, I conclude by drawing attention to a number of issues in contemporary argumentation studies that may benefit from a reconsideration of Perelman’s analysis of time. (shrink)

Humans have been shown capable of performing many cognitive tasks using information of which they are not consciously aware. This raises questions about what role consciousness actually plays in cognition. Here, we explored whether participants can learn cue-target contingencies in an attentional learning task when the cues were presented below the level of conscious awareness, and how this differs from learning about conscious cues. Participants’ manual (Experiment 1) and saccadic (Experiment 2) response speeds were influenced by both conscious and unconscious (...) cues. However, participants were only able to adapt to reversals of the cue-target contingencies (Experiment 1) or changes in the reliability of the cues (Experiment 2) when consciously aware of the cues. Therefore, although visual cues can be processed unconsciously, learning about cues over a few trials requires conscious awareness of them. Finally, we discuss implications for cognitive theories of consciousness. (shrink)

In his 2010 work, The Grand Design, Stephen Hawking, argues that ‘… philosophy is dead’. While not a Philosopher, Hawking provides strong argument for his thesis, principally that philosophers have not taken science sufficiently seriously and so Philosophy is no longer relevant to knowledge claims. In this paper, Hawking’s claim is appraised and critiqued, becoming a meta-philosophical discussion. It is argued that Philosophy is dead, in some sense, due to particular philosophers having embarked on an intellectual path no longer in (...) keeping with the ancient definition of Philosophy. Philosophy as the seeking of wisdom necessarily includes the consideration of findings of other intellectual pursuits, including physical and natural science. While Philosophy has justifiably evolved through its long history, is it unrecognisable in the terms by which it historically defined itself? Seeking consistency, Hawking is critiqued for appearing to practise ‘dead’ Philosophy. Indeed, Hawking’s appeal to multiverse theory and his core discussion of the metaphysical problem of being are philosophical. The question of the death of Philosophy has contemporary relevance for the discipline which is particularly under threat for its survival in the academy, oftentimes assumed to be irrelevant. (shrink)

Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, in Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness, assert that rejecting the use nudges is ‘pointless’ because ‘[i]n many cases, some kind of nudge is inevitable’. Schlomo Cohen makes a similar claim. He asserts that in certain situations surgeons cannot avoid nudging patients either toward or away from consenting to surgical interventions. Cohen concludes that in these situations, nudging patients toward consenting to surgical interventions is uncriticizable or morally permissible. I call this argument: The (...) Unavoidability Argument. In this essay, I will respond to Cohen's use of the unavoidability argument in support of using nudges during the process of informed consent. Specifically, I argue that many so-called ‘unavoidable nudges’ are, in fact, avoidable. Although my argument is directed toward Cohen's use of the unavoidability argument, it is applicable to the unavoidability argument more generally. (shrink)

We present a general cognitive architecture that tightly integrates symbolic, spatial, and visual representations. A key means to achieving this integration is allowing cognition to move freely between these modes, using mental imagery. The specific components and their integration are motivated by results from psychology, as well as the need for developing a functional and efficient implementation. We discuss functional benefits that result from the combination of multiple content-based representations and the specialized processing units associated with them. Instantiating this theory, (...) we then discuss the architectural components and processes, and illustrate the resulting functional advantages in two spatially and visually rich domains. The theory is then compared to other prominent approaches in the area. (shrink)

We are currently developing a short, online ethics course that attempts to teach students why well-intentioned people act unethically and what students can do to decrease the likelihood that they will find themselves in the middle of an ethical crisis in the future. Most of the well-known case studies in professional ethics textbooks concern ethical failures that do not involve difficult ethical choices. When our students read these case studies, it is not difficult for them to determine what went wrong (...) or what the players in the cases ought to have done. And students don’t need to read Kant or Mill to make these determinations. Importantly, the agents who acted wrongly usually seem to be ethical people. Rarely do cases involve moral monsters. In a similar vein, most cases of research misconduct are cut-and-dry, and most of our students who plagiarize did not enroll in the course intending to plagiarize. Rather, something went wrong. Professional ethics classes neglect to address an important practical question: Why do well-intentioned people find themselves in the middle of ethical crises and how can our students decrease the likelihood that they will find themselves in an ethical crisis in the future? We are developing a course that answers this question. Our course is built around the findings of John Dorris and other situationists. After teaching our students about situationism, we teach them a two-level theory of cognition that may help them avoid acting unethically. (shrink)

Inspired by Husserl’s (1913/1962, 1925/1977, 1931/1960, 1948/1973, 1954/1970) long term interest in problems of “constitution” at transcendental, psychological, and intersubjective levels, this study originally took up the question of the constitution of social perception in the context of the psychodiagnostic interview. More simply, the research question was: how do psychologists participate in forming a clinical impression? As reported earlier (Churchill 1984a, 19984b, 1998, 2006), data consisted of descriptions obtained from two clinical psychologists reflecting upon their experience during the interview phase (...) of a diagnostic assessment, each of which was videotaped for later reference. These descriptions were obtained in writing, and served as a basis for further elaborating and clarifying their experience through a series of collaborative interviews. The descriptions and interview data were collated into a text of statements for each participant representing different perceptual “moments” distinguishable within the psychologist’s experience. The researcher performed an “intentional analysis” of these experiential moments within the data, posing the following question: What does this statement reveal about the meaning-constituting activity of the psychologist during this moment of the clinical encounter? The “intentional structure” of clinical impression formation was articulated in terms of three interconnected and essential constituents – constitutive projects and interests, modes of attention, and modes of explication – all characteristic of the psychologist’s presence to a patient. The current paper offers a further reflection upon the methodological virtues of the phenomenological method of intentional analysis with an aim to clarify how psychologists can fruitfully apply this philosophical psychological method in qualitative research investigations on perception, cognition, attention, attribution, reflexivity, and psychological understanding. (shrink)

In “Nudging, Bullshitting, and the Meta-Nudge”, the author responds to William Simkulet’s claim that nudging is bullshitting (according to Harry Frankfurt’s analysis of bullshit and bullshitting), and therefore nudging during the process of informed consent renders consent invalid. The author argues that nudging is not necessarily bullshitting and then explains that although this issue is philosophically interesting, practically speaking, even if nudging is bullshitting, it does not follow that nudging necessarily renders informed consent invalid. This is obviously true in those (...) situations in which nudging during the process of informed consent is unavoidable. The author concludes with a discussion of the meta-nudge and suggests that physicians can use the meta-nudge to eliminate or decrease the power of inappropriate, problematic, or undesirable nudges. (shrink)

This paper argues that Ricœur’s philosophy operates on the basis of a more expansive conception of rhetoric than it first appears. To show this, I reread The Rule of Metaphor through the “new rhetoric” of Chaïm Perelman. First, I survey Ricœur’s understanding of rhetoric in the 1950s and 60s. Second, I examine Ricœur’s relation to Perelman within the context of the broader “rhetorical turn” of the 1970s. After examining their respective positions, I argue that Ricœur fails to appreciate the full (...) significance of Perelman’s conception of audience. In doing so, I draw attention to the central role that Ricœur himself ascribes to the audience or reader in the “work of meaning.” I conclude by proposing that the rhetorical triad of logos/ethos/pathos may serve as a conceptual matrix with which the rhetorical aspects of Ricœur’s philosophy can be interpreted. (shrink)

This paper will explore the evolution of the conceptions of Satan (the devil), and demons throughout the past 3,000 years, in light of an in-depth study of St. Anselm of Canterbury’s medieval text, The Fall of Satan (De Casu Diaboli). Anselm’s brilliant work, De Casu Diaboli, has inspired much reflection into not just the nature of angels and demons but also into our own. It is worth noting that, it is impossible to exhaustively cover a 3,000-year period on such a (...) major topic, but a brief overview of the significant periods will be provided before focusing on De Casu Diaboli. (shrink)

In this essay I discuss a novel engineering ethics class that has the potential to significantly decrease the likelihood that students will inadvertently or unintentionally act unethically in the future. This class is different from standard engineering ethics classes in that it focuses on the issue of why people act unethically and how students can avoid a variety of hurdles to ethical behavior. I do not deny that it is important for students to develop cogent moral reasoning and ethical decision-making (...) as taught in traditional college-level ethics classes, but as an educator, I aim to help students apply moral reasoning in specific, real-life situations so they are able to make ethical decisions and act ethically in their academic careers and after they graduate. Research in moral psychology provides evidence that many seemingly irrelevant situational factors affect the moral judgment of most moral agents and frequently lead agents to unintentionally or inadvertently act wrongly. I argue that, in addition to teaching college students moral reasoning and ethical decision-making, it is important to: 1. Teach students about psychological and situational factors that affect people’s ethical judgments/behaviors in the sometimes stressful, emotion-laden environment of the workplace; 2. Guide students to engage in critical reflection about the sorts of situations they personally might find ethically challenging before they encounter those situations; and 3. Provide students with strategies to help them avoid future unethical behavior when they encounter these situations in school and in the workplace. (shrink)

In their contributions to the symposium “Just War and Unjust Soldiers,” Michael Walzer, Jeff McMahan, and Robert O. Keohane add greatly to our understanding of how best to study and apply just war doctrine to real-world conflicts. We argue, however, that they underestimate both the degree to which the American public seeks revenge, rather than just reciprocity, and the extent of popular acceptance of violations of noncombatant immunity by soldiers perceived to be fighting for a just cause. We call on (...) empirical political scientists, lawyers, psychologists, and historians to engage with moral philosophers and political theorists in debates about the influence of just war theory and the laws of armed conflict. (shrink)

The ultimate challenge for psychology as a human science inheres in accessing the experience of the other. In general, the field of psychology has perpetuated the epistemological dualism of distinguishing between the realm accessible by external perception and the realm accessible by inner perception, and hence between the subjective and the objective , regarding the "first person" perspective as a legitimate means of access only to one's own private experience, while insisting that all others' experience must be observed from a (...) neutral "third person" perspective. By reflecting on his participant-observational encounters with the animal other of the Bonobo, the author attempts to demonstrate in this paper the possibility of a third approach between the antinomy of methodological subjectivism and methodological objectivism as a way out of the dilemmas posed by epistemological dualism. The alternative proposed is the "second person" framework of observation, which, by invoking empathic seeing as its means of accessing the private space of the other and creating the space of the "in between", allows for intersubjective engagement in an experiential gestalt consisting of "myself and the other", and offers the possibility of testing one's ‘own' experience of an intersubjective moment in dialogue with the other. In so far as it infers the focusing of consciousness on embodied experience and expression, and the synthesis of receptive and proprioceptive consciousness in "experiaction" , the "second person" perspective restores inner reality to the realm of the observable, and thus reclaims observation as the method of psychology, and behaviour as its subject matter. The notion of empathy and intuition as a reliable and valid mode of access to the psychological life of others is substantiated theoretically with reference to inter alia Husserl's concepts of "coupling" and "co-constitution", Merleau-Ponty's notions of "inter-corporeality" or "carnal intersubjectivity" and of "the intertwining and the chiasm" of the "Ineinander" as constitutive of the "flesh of the world", Laing's postulation of the possibility of "interexperience", and the sense of union with the object of perception implied by Scheler's term "Einsfühlung" as the essence of intersubjective encounter. (shrink)